Determining maximal entropy functions for objective Bayesian inductive logic

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Progic, Munich 1st September 2021

1 Objective Bayesian inductive logic

Inductive entailment relationship (Haenni et al., 2011):

$$\varphi_1^{X_1},\ldots,\varphi_k^{X_k} \succcurlyeq \psi^{Y}.$$

where

 $\varphi_1, \ldots, \varphi_k, \psi$ are sentences of a logical language \mathcal{L}

 X_1, \ldots, X_k, Y are probabilities or sets of probabilities.

Objective Bayesian inductive logic:

$$\varphi_1^{X_1},\ldots,\varphi_k^{X_k} \not \approx \psi^{\Upsilon}$$

iff $P^{\dagger}(\psi) \in Y$ for every probability function P^{\dagger} , from all those that satisfy the premisses, that has maximal entropy.

Suppose \mathcal{L} is a propositional language with atomic sentences a_1, \ldots, a_n :

$$\Omega_n \stackrel{\mathrm{df}}{=} \{ \pm a_1 \wedge \cdots \wedge \pm a_n \}.$$

$$H_n(P) \stackrel{\text{df}}{=} -\sum_{\omega \in \Omega} P(\omega) \log P(\omega).$$

Find the function P^{\dagger} , from those that satisfy $\varphi_1^{X_1}, \ldots, \varphi_k^{X_k}$, with maximum entropy.



Answer the following question:


$$g \to h, h \land l \land \neg g^{1/16} \not\approx g^?$$

Think of the total probability as contained in a jug and to be distributed evenly amongst people at a table, who represent possible outcomes, given constraints:




First constraint: $g \rightarrow h$

Second constraint: $P(hl \neg g) = 1/16$



Then share evenly:



A truth table can be used instead:

Р	h	l	g	$g \rightarrow h$	$h \wedge l \wedge \neg g$	g
3/16	Т	Т	Т	Т	F	Т
1/16	T	Т	F	Т	T	F
3/16	T	F	Т	Т	F	T
3/16	T	F	F	T	F	F
0	F	Т	Т	F	F	T
3/16	F	Т	F	T	F	F
0	F	F	Т	F	F	T
3/16	F	F	F	T	F	F

$$P(g) = P(hlg) + P(h\neg lg) + P(\neg hlg) + P(\neg h\neg lg)$$

$$= 3/16 + 3/16 + 0 + 0$$

$$= 6/16$$

$$= 3/8$$

So

$$g \rightarrow h, h \wedge l \wedge \neg g^{1/16} \not \approx g^{3/8}.$$

What if \mathcal{L} is a first-order predicate language?

Finitely many relation symbols U_1, \ldots, U_l ,

Countably many constant symbols $t_1, t_2, ...$

Atomic sentences a_1, a_2, \ldots ordered such that those involving only t_1, \ldots, t_n occur before those involving t_{n+1} , for each n,

Finite sublanguages \mathcal{L}_n involve only t_1, \ldots, t_n .


$$\Omega_n \stackrel{\text{df}}{=} \{ \pm \alpha_1 \wedge \cdots \wedge \pm \alpha_{r_n} \}$$
, the states of \mathcal{L}_n .

$$\mathbb{E} \stackrel{\text{df}}{=} \{ P \in \mathbb{P} : P(\varphi_1) \in X_1, \dots, P(\varphi_k) \in X_k \}.$$

maxent \mathbb{E} is the set of functions in \mathbb{E} that are not dominated in entropy:

 $maxent \mathbb{E} \stackrel{df}{=} \{P \in \mathbb{E} : \text{ there is no } Q \in \mathbb{E}, N \in \mathbb{N} \text{ such that } H_n(Q) > H_n(P) \text{ for } n \ge N\}.$





2 Entropy limit points

In certain circumstances maxent \mathbb{E} is a limit of n-entropy maximisers.

Suppose $X_1, ..., X_k$ are convex and the premisses are satisfiable.

Consider:

$$\mathbb{H}_n = \{ P \in \mathbb{E} : H_n(P) \text{ is maximised } \}.$$

 $P \in \mathbb{P}$ is an **entropy limit point** of \mathbb{E} if for each n there is some $Q_n \in \mathbb{H}_n$ such that $|H_n(Q_n) - H_n(P)| \longrightarrow 0$ as $n \longrightarrow \infty$.

This property enables us to characterise maxent \mathbb{E} more constructively:

Theorem 1. If \mathbb{E} contains an entropy limit point P then

$$maxent \mathbb{E} = \{P\}.$$

Note that there can be at most one entropy limit point *P*.

Example 2. Suppose we have a single premiss $\forall x U x^c$ where \mathcal{L} has a single unary predicate U. The following probability function is an entropy limit point:

$$P(\omega_n) = \begin{cases} c + \frac{1-c}{2^n} & : & \omega_n = Ut_1 \land \cdots \land Ut_n \\ \frac{1-c}{2^n} & : & \omega_n \models \neg(Ut_1 \land \cdots \land Ut_n) \end{cases}.$$

 $P \in \mathbb{E}$ because $P(\forall x U x) = \lim_{n \to \infty} P(\theta_n) = c$. Hence by Theorem 1, maxent $\mathbb{E} = \{P\}$.

Example 3. Consider a single categorical premiss $U_1t_1 \vee \exists x \forall y U_2xy$. In this case $\mathbb{H}_n = \{P_=\}$ for all n. Thus the equivocator function is the unique entropy limit point of \mathbb{E} . However, the equivocator function is not in \mathbb{E} , so it cannot be the maximal entropy function.



3 Conditionalisation and entropy limit points

Special case:

The premisses are categorical sentences $\varphi_1, \dots \varphi_k$ of \mathcal{L} .

Let φ abbreviate $\varphi_1 \wedge \cdots \wedge \varphi_k$.

We will consider $\mathbb{E} = \mathbb{E}_{\varphi} \stackrel{\text{df}}{=} \{ P \in \mathbb{P} : P(\varphi) = 1 \}.$

Corollary 4. If $P_{=}(\cdot|\varphi)$ is an entropy limit point of \mathbb{E}_{φ} then

maxent
$$\mathbb{E}_{\varphi} = \{P_{=}(\cdot|\varphi)\}.$$

Corollary 5. If \mathbb{H}_n contains $P_{=}(\cdot|\varphi)$ for sufficiently large n then

maxent
$$\mathbb{E}_{\varphi} = \{P_{=}(\cdot|\varphi)\}.$$

Example 6. Suppose we have a single categorical premiss $\exists xUx$, where \mathcal{L} has a single unary predicate symbol U. $P_{=}(\exists xUx) = 1$, so $P_{=}(\cdot|\exists xUx) = P_{=}(\cdot)$. $P_{=} \in \mathbb{H}_{1}, \mathbb{H}_{2}, \ldots$, so Corollary 5 applies and $\max \mathbb{E}_{\varphi} = \{P_{=}\}$.



4 An alternative route to conditionalisation

This section demonstrates agreement between the maximal entropy approach and conditionalisation without appeal to entropy limit points.

Again we consider categorical sentences $\varphi_1, \ldots, \varphi_k$ and abbreviate $\varphi_1 \wedge \cdots \wedge \varphi_k$ by φ .

Let sentence φ^n be the disjunction of those n-states ω such that $\varphi \wedge \omega$ has positive measure:

$$\varphi^n \stackrel{\mathrm{df}}{=} \bigvee \{ \omega \in \Omega_n : P_{=}(\omega \wedge \varphi) > 0 \}.$$

Let N be the greatest index of constants appearing in φ .

Theorem 7 (Agreement with Conditionalisation). For all $\varphi \in SL$ with $P_{=}(\varphi) \in (0,1]$ and all $n \geq N$ it holds that

maxent
$$\mathbb{E}_{\varphi} = \{P_{=}(\cdot|\varphi)\} = \{P_{=}(\cdot|\varphi^{n})\} = \{P_{=}(\cdot|\varphi^{N})\}$$
.

Example 8. For the premiss sentence $\varphi = (\exists x \forall y Uxy \land Ut_1t_1) \lor (\forall x \exists y \neg Uxy \land \neg Ut_1t_1)$ it holds that

$$maxent \mathbb{E} = \{P_{=}(\cdot | \neg Ut_1t_1)\} .$$



5 Jeffrey Conditionalisation

Consider the premiss φ^c for $P_=(\varphi)$, $c \in (0, 1)$.

Theorem 9 (Jeffrey Conditionalisation). For all $c \in (0, 1)$ and all $\varphi \in SL$ such that $P_{=}(\varphi) \in (0, 1)$, the maximal entropy function is obtained by Jeffrey Conditionalisation with respect to the equivocator function:

$$maxent \mathbb{E} = \{P^{\dagger}\}\$$

where

$$P^{\dagger}(\cdot) = c \cdot P_{=}(\cdot | \varphi^{N}) + (1 - c) \cdot P_{=}(\cdot | \neg \varphi^{N}) .$$



6 Preservation

Theorem 10 (Preservation). If $\aleph \theta$ and $\aleph \neg \varphi$, then $\varphi^c \aleph \theta$ for any $c \in (0, 1]$.

Related to:

Obstinacy (Paris, 1994, p. 99)

Rational Monotonicity (Lehmann and Magidor, 1992, §3.4)

Absolute Continuity



7 Conclusion

The concept of an entropy limit point can help with the general problem of determining maximal entropy functions.

If premisses have positive measure, maxent agrees with Bayesian Conditionalisation.

This extends to Jeffrey Conditionalisation.

Open questions:

How do we determine maxent when φ has zero measure?

In some cases we can appeal to entropy limit points.

EG ∀xUx^c

In some cases, there is no maximal entropy function.

EG $\exists x \forall Y U x y$, or $\forall x \exists y \forall z S x y z$

Does maxent depend on the order of the constants?

(The greater entropy relation is relative to a specific ordering.)

Thanks to Alena Vencovska, Jeff Paris, Leverhulme Trust, DFG.



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